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Abstract
This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub- and non-state involve-
ment in post-2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub- and non-state action is a necessary complement to
national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low-carbon and climate-resilient development as envisaged
in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal-type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather
expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show
that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobiliza-
tion efforts remain event-driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub- and non-state action.
Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable develop-
ment impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world
seeks to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribu-
tion in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub-
and non-state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.
Policy Implications
• A post-2020 action space within the UNFCCC process remains crucial and might even be more important than before.
• A post-2020 Global Climate Action Agenda could exemplify a new avenue of cooperation, featuring effective international
cooperation not only between governments, but also with, and between, sub- and non-state actors that provide solutions
in a highly interconnected and globalized world.
• The transition from the pre-2020 climate action agenda to a post-2020 agenda provides a political opportunity to recali-
brate the design of a catalytic framework that effectively responds to the need for successful international cooperation
and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement.
• A post-2020 agenda should help accelerate implementation at the national level, amplify ambition of subsequent NDC
cycles, and inform ambitious ‘long term strategies’.
• Through collaboration with regional and national processes action, the Global Climate Action Agenda could more effec-
tively encourage the engagement of sub- and non-state climate action at lower levels of governance.
• Collaboration between multiple platforms that orchestrate climate and sustainable development action could improve
reflexivity and deliberativeness of governance practices. Such could also help generate outcomes that are considered more
just when trade-offs occur between different aspects of sustainable development.
• By seizing opportunities and expanding the post-2020 Global Climate Action Agenda according to the design principles of
a collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic framework, it would not only improve upon previous engagement
activities in the context of the UNFCCC, but also make a vital contribution to climate action in challenging times.
Linking intergovernmental climate governance
and sub- and non-state action
The 2015 Paris Agreement marked a major shift in the cli-
mate regime1.. Instead of allocating greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions targets between governments, it introduced a
process whereby countries define their own climate targets,
called ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs), which
would be reviewed and strengthened periodically. Moreover,
the decision adopting the Paris Agreement recognizes the
role of sub- and non-state actors, including cities, regions,
businesses, investors, civil society organizations and the
transnational initiatives and networks in which they are
engaged. It calls upon such ‘non-party stakeholders’ to
pledge and help deliver climate action (Andonova et al.,
2017; Chan et al., 2016; Hale, 2016; Roger et al., 2017). They
are no longer considered ‘mere’ observers to, and subjects
of, the intergovernmental process, but vital contributors to
the implementation of climate targets. In this context, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) is not only facilitating intergovernmental negotia-
tions, but increasingly building links between these negotia-
tions and sub- and non-state actors (Hale, 2016).
While deeper intergovernmental climate cooperation
remains elusive after the Paris Agreement, the shift towards
polycentric climate governance could set the stage for
increasingly ambitious climate action (Hale, 2020; Jordan
et al., 2015; Keohane and Victor, 2016). Sub- and non-state
actions do not substitute governmental efforts but through
repeated interactions they can build trust and incrementally
incentivize more ambition and international cooperation. As
current governmental policies fall far short from the low-car-
bon and climate resilient development pathway envisaged
in the Paris Agreement, sub- and non-state action appears
to be critical for realizing low-carbon and climate-resilient
development, and for addressing persistent mitigation,
financing and other ambition gaps in climate governance
(Hsu et al., 2020; Kuramochi et al., 2020; Lui et al., 2020).
However, questions have been raised about the growing
engagement of non- and sub-state actions in the climate
regime. For instance, whether such efforts are effective in
achieving their goals (Chan et al., 2019; Michaelowa and
Michaelowa, 2017) and whether they contribute to growing
complexity and fragmentation in governance, possibly rais-
ing legitimacy questions (Kuyper et al., 2018). Therefore, the
question of whether institutional linkages between the
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state-centered climate regime and non-state and sub-state
action can effectively catalyze climate action is critical
(Hermwille, 2018).
In the lead-up to the Paris Agreement, a series of initia-
tives were undertaken to link the UNFCCC with non-party
stakeholders. These included efforts by successive presiden-
cies of the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties (COP) and
the UNFCCC Secretariat to catalyze action, in particular the
‘Lima-Paris Action Agenda’ (LPAA), which launched 70 large-
scale cooperative initiatives ahead of COP21 in Paris; a Tech-
nical Examination Process, which brings together sub- and
non-state actors as well as parties to jointly consider climate
change mitigation solutions (TEP-M); the ‘Non-state Actor
Zone for Climate Action’ (NAZCA) now known as the ‘Global
Climate Action Portal’ (GCAP), which records sub- and non-
state action; Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE), which
develops educational and awareness programs, and pro-
motes public participation; and the Momentum for Change
initiative, which highlights promising replicable and scalable
projects. Moreover, since COP21, the UNFCCC has launched
a Technical Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A), and
established the ‘Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate
Action’ (MPGCA), which engages sub- and non-state actors
through events at UN climate conferences, and reports on
the progress of sub- and non-state actions in the Yearbook
of Global Climate Action.
Outside of the formal UNFCCC process, similar engage-
ment activities have been held, for instance the 2014 and
2019 UN Climate Summits, hosted by the United Nations
Secretary General; the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit,
convened by former California Governor Jerry Brown; and
the recurring One Planet Summit, under the leadership of
French President Emmanuel Macron. In addition, thematic
events and ‘Regional Climate Weeks’ have been held in
Africa, Latin-America and the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific
region. While these moments and activities are driven by
different actors, they seek to build on each other’s efforts by
collaborating and recognizing each other’s initiatives. We
gather these functionally and programmatically linked activi-
ties under the single heading of ‘Global Climate Action
Agenda’ (GCAA) (see Figure 1), as they comprise the major
sub- and non-state engagement processes in global climate
governance. Our understanding of GCAA as functionally and
programmatically linked activities to mobilize and engage
non-state and subnational actors in climate action is not
intended to be comprehensive; for instance, our analysis
does not include many processes at the regional and
national levels. Instead, we focus on GCAA processes that
are more proximate to the UNFCCC process.
Despite growing interest in the GCAA (e.g. Chan et al.,
2018a; Widerberg, 2017), a comprehensive evaluation is
missing. Such an evaluation is timely for several reasons.
First, the GCAA encompasses several activities known as the
‘pre-2020 Agenda’, a UNFCCC workstream dedicated to
immediate action, which was opened in 2011 alongside the
negotiations track towards the Paris Agreement. This work-
stream began exploring the potential for ‘non-party’ initia-
tives to reduce emissions before the adoption of a new
agreement. Following a decision at the COP25 in Madrid in
2019, many activities are set to continue beyond 2020,
including the MPGCA, the appointment of ‘High-Level Cli-
mate Action Champions’ (UNFCCC, 2019a) and the tracking
of voluntary action in the NAZCA portal (UNFCCC, 2019a).
While such an extension of UNFCCC activities is vital to the
functioning and coordination within the GCAA, important
opportunities arise to significantly improve links between
sub- and non-state actors, governments and the intergov-
ernmental process as we enter a new decade of climate
action. Second, the UNFCCC has mostly completed its insti-
tutional architecture with the adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment and the corresponding ‘rulebook’ at COP24 in
Katowice. The emphasis of future COPs will shift to imple-
mentation instead, and a well-designed GCAA could be a
vital part of this shift in focus. Moreover, the global health
and economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic
has unexpectedly impacted the post-2020 outlook for cli-
mate action, creating an opportunity to reflect on, and
improve, the GCAA. This crisis illustrates how delayed
responses can prove costly, something that also holds true
for the climate crisis. While governments decide on sustain-
able recovery packages, sub- and non-state actors should
promote sustainable practices, including reducing green-
house gases and building resilience to climate impacts.
However, such efforts cannot be assumed, as both state and
non-state actors may prioritize immediate economic recov-
ery over long-term decarbonization and climate-resilient
development. A post-2020 GCAA should help state and non-
state actors to simultaneously pursue economic recovery
and sustainable development.
Our approach and analytical framework
This study builds on an inclusive multidisciplinary dialogue
involving researchers, practitioners, and decision-makers
from both developed and developing countries. It aims to
review the GCAA and to discuss options for improving sub-
and non-state actor engagement in the post-2020 climate
regime. In the following, we explain our approach.
First, we introduce a heuristic framework based on institu-
tional design principles. Then, we assess the extent to which
these principles have been met by reviewing scholarly litera-
ture as well as ‘grey literature’, for instance reports and stud-
ies by experts and international organizations. An
exceptionally diverse and multidisciplinary group of co-au-
thors helped to ensure the inclusion of relevant literature
since 2015. Finally, based on the literature review and our
multidisciplinary dialogue, the GCAA is evaluated and oppor-
tunities are highlighted to strengthen the action agenda in
the post-2020 context.
We derive our heuristic framework from Chan et al.
(2015), who propose design principles for a sub- and non-
state engagement framework, based on earlier experiences
of UN organizations involved in mobilizing sub- and non-
state actors in sustainability governance, and building on
the ‘orchestration’ literature (Abbott and Snidal, 2010;
Abbott et al., 2016; Hale and Roger, 2014). Proponents of
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orchestration view international organizations as facilitators
of engagement to achieve public goals through the actions
of intermediary actors. Critically, the orchestrator does not –
or cannot – order target actors to pursue certain objectives,
but rather enlists intermediaries, for instance partnerships
and collaborative networks, who in turn reach out to target
actors. In so doing, the orchestrator steers at arm’s length to
ensure that intermediaries’ actions promote its policy agenda
(Abbott et al., 2016). Fragmented issue areas such as climate
change are most suitable for such steering. Research on
orchestration has focused, in particular, on explaining the
occurrence of orchestration (Abbott 2015), the motives
behind orchestration efforts, as well as their effectiveness in
reaching these goals (Abbott and Snidal, 2010; Chan et al.,
2015; Chan and Pauw, 2014; Hale and Roger, 2014). As
orchestration contributes to structuring in a fragmented cli-
mate governance context without applying hierarchical forms
of direct control and authority, it is a central concept for eval-
uating GCAA (Abbott, 2015).
To strengthen sub- and non-state engagement in the real-
ization of global climate goals, Chan et al. (2015) proposed that
orchestration in the UNFCCC context should be collaborative,
comprehensive, evaluative, and catalytic. While we recognize
that overlaps exist between these design principles (e.g. the
recording of climate action involves collaboration, and is also
fundamental for the evaluation of non-state efforts), they are
useful as a heuristic tool to evaluate the GCAA. In the follow-
ing, we describe each design principle, as well as explain how
we assess activities in the GCAA to determine the extent to
which a principle has materialized since 2015.
First, the framework should be collaborative by sharing
design and operational responsibilities between key orches-
trators, including the UNFCCC Secretariat, COP presidencies,
other international organizations, sub- and non-state actors,
and governmental partners in cooperative initiatives. Func-
tions such as the recording, monitoring and support of cli-
mate actions, maintaining registration platforms, and the
organization of events, are already performed individually. In
a collaborative framework different actors fulfill functions
more efficiently than a single orchestrator might (Biermann
et al., 2012). We assess the extent to which the GCAA is col-
laborative by observing coordination between orchestrators
over time across levels of governance, and between major
mobilization processes – particularly between climate action
summits since 2015 – as well as collaboration in the record-
ing of mobilized actions.






Other interna al processes
Global Climat Agenda
UNFCCC Ac vi s
o Lima-Paris Ac on Agenda (2014-2015)
o Technical Examina on Process on 
Mi ga on/Adapta on (TEP-M/TEP-A)
o Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Ac on 
(MPGCA)
o High-level Climate Ac on Champions
o High-level events
o Yearbook of Global Climate Ac on
o NAZCA/Global Climate Ac on Portal
o Climate Ac on Methodologies, Data and 
Analysis (CAMDA)
o Momentum for Change
o Ac on for Climate Empowerment (ACE)
Ac vi s outside the UNFCCC context
o UN Climate Summit 2014; 2019
o Global Climate Ac on Summit 2018
o Regional Climate Weeks
o One Planet Summit 2017, 2018, 2019
o …
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Second, the framework should be comprehensive in that it
provides a systematic overview of functional and participa-
tory patterns of mitigation, adaptation and other climate
actions across the broad landscape of sub- and non-state
engagement. Such an overview helps to highlight in which
areas more engagement may be needed and what types of
actions are warranted, thereby informing strategic interven-
tions and policy priorities for orchestrators. We assess com-
prehensiveness by observing the growth in recorded actions
both vis-a-vis mitigation and adaptation, and whether and
to which extent actions involve underrepresented sectors
and actors.
Third, the framework should be evaluative by creating
common methods and benchmarks for assessing progress.
Systematic tracking of impacts could help governments
assess the contribution of sub- and non-state actors. Best
performers could also be identified, incentivizing them and
others to accelerate implementation and heighten ambition.
To assess this, we observe the progress made on method-
ologies to evaluate sub- and non-state actions, both in
terms of (ex ante) commitment-making and in terms of (ex
post) changes in environmental and social impacts.
Finally, an orchestration framework should be catalytic
(Hale, 2020), generating additional climate action, particu-
larly in thematic and geographic areas where more action is
needed. To assess this, we focus on the demand for non-
state and climate action in developing countries and
whether a higher growth of (recorded) climate action can
be observed.
A collaborative GCAA?
First steps towards a collaborative GCAA were taken prior to
the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. The LPAA was set up by
Peru and France (respectively the presidencies of COP20
and COP21) to mobilize sub- and non-state climate action,
in close collaboration with the UNFCCC Secretariat, and the
Office of the UN Secretary-General, which had previously
organized the 2014 UN Climate Summit. The Peruvian gov-
ernment also launched the NAZCA portal, with support from
the UNFCCC Secretariat. Under the pre-2020 agenda, the
UNFCCC Secretariat organized sectoral conversations under
the TEP to demonstrate the potential of mitigation solutions,
involving joint programming with multiple organizations
beyond the UNFCCC.
The capacity for longer-term coordination and collabora-
tion on climate action received a strong boost in the COP21
decision accompanying the Paris Agreement. Besides adding
a TEP on adaptation, it called on the UNFCCC Secretariat to
annually summarize meetings under the TEPs for policymak-
ers (UNFCCC, 2015); encouraged sub- and non-state actors
to register their commitments through the NAZCA portal;
and established the position of High-level Climate Action
Champions, tasking them with the organization of annual
high-level events to convene state and non-state dignitaries
at every COP until 2020 (Chan et al., 2016; Hsu et al., 2018).
The newly appointed Champions launched the MPGCA in
2016 to liaise with stakeholders across various thematic and
cross-cutting areas (land use; oceans and coastal zones;
water; human settlements; transport; energy; industry; cli-
mate resilience and climate finance); to facilitate dialogue
between government and sub- and non-state actors; and to
organize high-level events. Moreover, in recent years, the
GCAA has increasingly sought to coordinate activities
regionally, with Champions integrating ‘Regional Climate
Weeks’ in the Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Latin America
into their work plans.
While the MPGCA and the Champions raised the institu-
tional capacity to coordinate among multiple actors, collabo-
ration in terms of brokering new coalitions and launching
new initiatives remains largely event-driven. Since 2015,
major summits, such as the 2017 One Planet Summit, the
2018 Climate Action Summit and the 2019 UN Climate Sum-
mit, have been designed and organized outside of the
UNFCCC. These events have been criticized for the enor-
mous effort they require, and the ensuing fatigue among
sub- and non-state actors to yet again generate new
announcements, possibly distracting from other vital func-
tions. For instance, while many commitments are
announced at these summits, once out of the public eye, lit-
tle effort is invested in understanding their progress (Dinesh,
2019). The GCAA, however, plays an important role by
recording commitments and bringing them into its collabo-
rative data-collection and management environment, even
when a platform such as NAZCA could still be better struc-
tured to allow for more easy data extraction and processing
to facilitate analyses (see GO FAIR n.d.).
A comprehensive GCAA?
Chan et al. (2015) argued that an orchestration framework
should be comprehensive by bringing together information
from existing sources and registries of sub- and non-state
actions. In terms of recording many sub- and non-state
actions across a wide range of sectors, the GCAA could be
considered successful. The longest continuous collaborative
effort within the GCAA has been the UNFCCC-administered
NAZCA portal. Since its launch in 2014, the portal has
recorded a growing number of sub- and non-state climate
actions and ‘cooperative initiatives’. In contrast to earlier UN
registration platforms, data are provided by various external
data partners (CDP, Carbon Climate Registry, The Climate
Group, Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change, UN Glo-
bal Compact, Global Covenant of Mayors, Climate Bonds Ini-
tiative and UN Environment’s Climate Initiatives Platform).
This innovative collaboration moved much of the labor- and
capital-intensive data-gathering outside of the UNFCCC. Fur-
thermore, it depoliticized decisions on the inclusion and
exclusion of particular initiatives. The close cooperation
between the GCAA and data providers resulted in more
recorded actions, from just over 900 commitments in 2014
to over 27,000 in 2020. However, comprehensiveness of
data should be evaluated by more sophisticated indicators
than large numbers.
First, it remains unclear if an increasing number of
recorded actions are conducive to the decarbonization of
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the global economy and to more sustainable and climate-re-
silient pathways. The NAZCA portal does not assess the con-
sistency of these actions with the goals of the Paris
Agreement, their timeframes or the pathways to getting
there. Large parts of the economy also remain absent from
NAZCA (Hsu et al., 2016), including some of the most pollut-
ing sectors, including aviation or fossil-fuel industries, while
businesses less affected by consumer scrutiny are also less
likely to take action. Such gaps in current records of climate
action hinder efforts to expand or correct activities, and to
identify drivers of, and roadblocks to, low-carbon and cli-
mate resilient development. Second, comprehensiveness
also depends on what counts as relevant action under the
GCAA. The pre-2020 agenda highlighted the transnational
contribution to climate mitigation rather than adaptation
(Chan et al., 2016). Since then, adaptation actions have been
emphasized at summits, and in the work of the Champions.
And yet, adaptation actions are less recorded and remain
underrepresented on platforms such as NAZCA, as well as at
various climate summits (Chan and Amling, 2019). Moreover,
despite a strong connection between climate action and
other aspects of sustainable development, data collection
does not systematically consider impacts on sustainable
development. The lack of such data may be a missed oppor-
tunity for furthering action in the context of systemic trans-
formation.
Going forward, more comprehensive data on sub- and
non-state action in underrepresented sectors, and on eco-
nomic, environmental and social impacts, would help the
GCAA and other mobilization processes to address participa-
tory imbalances in climate action, lagging sectors or under-
served communities.
An evaluative GCAA?
While collaboration among data providers was already well
established by 2015, collaboration on the evaluation of sub-
and non-state action was much less developed. Instead of
evaluation, efforts ahead of the Paris Climate Conference pri-
oritized the demonstration of the growing scale of sub- and
non-state efforts and their support for governments to
negotiate an ambitious deal (Jacobs, 2016). The LPAA acted
on an ‘intervention theory’ that such a growing scale of
action would encourage states to sign up to the global
agreement (Widerberg, 2017). Arguably, many commitments
were still too new to evaluate their impacts (Chan et al.,
2018b), and assessments of whether actors kept their pro-
mises have long been hindered by a lack of analytical tools
(Widerberg and Stripple, 2016). The earliest evaluations of
the mitigation impact of transnational actors were not based
on actual commitments, but on estimates of mitigation
potential within key sectors (e.g. Blok et al., 2012).
Progress has been made on methodologies to evaluate
the impact of sub- and non-state commitments (e.g. Hsu
et al., 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Hultman et al., 2018, 2019, 2020).
The number of evaluations has also been increasing, espe-
cially with regards to the potential to reduce GHG emissions.
Subsequent publications have highlighted the mitigation
potential of both individual and cooperative initiatives regis-
tered in the NAZCA database (Hsu et al., 2015; Kuramochi
et al., 2020; Lui et al., 2020; NewClimate et al., ; Roelfsema
et al., 2018; UNEP, 2019). Reporting on climate action
remains time- and resource-intensive, which may deter sub-
and non-state actors, particularly those with limited capacity.
Lower-cost alternatives to traditional forms of data collection
may eventually help build transparency without discourag-
ing actors. For instance, the Global Covenant of Mayors and
Google’s pilot ‘Environmental Insights Explorer’ leverages
global mapping data with GHG emission factors to estimate
city-scale building and transportation emissions (Google
n.d.). Technology-driven approaches such as combining the
Internet of Things with blockchain technology could also
eventually automate reporting in sectors like renewable
energy (Hsu et al., 2020b).
Crucially, the UNFCCC Secretariat has fostered closer
cooperation with the analytical and data communities by
co-convening meetings under the ‘Climate Action Method-
ologies Data and Analysis’ (‘Camda’) group, which is a col-
laborative body with over 30 organizations aiming to ensure
credible climate action by connecting and aligning report-
ing, data collection, and analytical methods. As a first step,
the UNFCCC Secretariat, data providers and leading
researchers developed a roadmap towards common meth-
ods and benchmarks to quantify mitigation actions (Hsu
et al., 2019b). Such harmonization would help build more
coherent and consistent data sets that are more readily
available to analysts (Van Staden and Appleby, 2019).
While growing cooperation gives reason for optimism
about the GCAA’s capacity to become an evaluative frame-
work, important gaps remain. First, the strong focus on miti-
gation impacts seems too narrow in the UNFCCC context,
which demands more data on adaptation, climate resilience,
and sustainable development (co-)benefits. Part of the diffi-
culty of tracking and analyzing impacts beyond mitigation is
due to the diversity of actions, many of which cannot easily
be quantified and compared across large samples. Nonethe-
less, researchers have developed methods for tracking non-
mitigation impacts, creating proxies in the absence of data
on societal and environmental impacts (Chan et al., 2018b,
2019; Dzebo, 2019; Hale et al., 2020). The MPGCA has
reported proximate indicators of impacts beyond mitigation
for a limited set of cooperative initiatives in recent editions
of the Yearbook of Global Climate Action (UNFCCC, 2017,
2018, 2019b). However, the NAZCA portal, the GCAA’s main
tracking tool, has yet to incorporate systematic tracking of
targets and impacts beyond mitigation. Second, as govern-
ments implement and revise their NDCs, accurate data are
needed at the country level to inform interactions with
other actors. Initial investigations on the mitigation potential
of sub- and non-state actors in 10 high-emitting economies
present a promising step in the right direction (Kuramochi
et al., 2020; Lui et al., 2020). However, they still assume full
implementation of commitments, which is unlikely when
many actions lack robust institutional designs (Michaelowa
and Michaelowa 2017) or when political and economic pri-
orities change with the current COVID-19 crisis. Moreover,
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assessments do not account for possibly substitutive rela-
tions between state and non-state actions.
Finally, the tracking of climate action falls short of evaluat-
ing actualized (ex post) environmental and social impacts.
This also holds true for tracking GHG emission reductions
that mostly relies on self-reported targets and commitments
(Chan et al., 2019; Hsu et al., 2019b). The further develop-
ment of GCAA as an evaluative framework will be crucial for
the credibility of sub- and non-state action, as their growth
alone is not meaningful if many remain commitments on
paper. Moreover, an evaluative GCAA will be vital to provide
specific data to help governments implement policies, track
progress and increase climate ambition.
A catalytic GCAA?
Finally, according to Chan et al. (2015), an orchestration
framework should be catalytic, generating additional, and
more ambitious, climate action particularly where it is most
needed. Evaluating the catalytic impact of the GCAA is diffi-
cult but it arguably should, at least, be evident in higher
growth rates of new climate initiatives, particularly where
such action is most needed, for instance in the global
South.
The growing number of commitments recorded might
lead to a positive evaluation of the GCAA. The NAZCA portal
reveals a growing scale and scope of climate action; more
than 10,000 cities and regions have made commitments,
alongside more than 6,000 businesses, representing an
annual revenue greater than the combined GDPs of China
and the United States (UNFCCC, 2019b). However, it is diffi-
cult to ascertain how much of this growth is due to the
GCAA. Nonetheless, much of the GCAA is premised on its
ability to inspire and support commitment-making. The
demonstration objective of TEMs and the Talanoa Dialogue,
a UNFCCC process held in 2018 designed to help countries
implement and enhance their NDCs by 2020, are clear
examples of non-state solutions being presented to govern-
ments in the hope that these will inspire application of sub-
and non-state solutions at scale. The UNFCCC’s Momentum
for Change Initiative awards ‘lighthouse packages’ (recently
rebranded as ‘UN Global Climate Action Awards’), highlight-
ing particularly innovative, ambitious, scalable and replicable
actions across thematic areas (e.g. gender, IT, and climate-
friendly investment). UNFCCC efforts therefore presuppose
the effectiveness of demonstration, and subsequent scaling
and replication by other (particularly public) actors. Cur-
rently, however, evidence on the impact of the GCAA
remains anecdotal. Processes to engage more actors priori-
tize the launching and showcasing of new commitments,
rather than demonstrating progress towards keeping exist-
ing commitments.
In 2015, a particular concern was to catalyze climate
action in developing countries to address their relative
underrepresentation. While the past five years have seen
increased representation from sub- and non-state actors in
developing and emerging economies (Global Covenant of
Mayors, 2018), these actors continue to be underrepresented
in NAZCA and in other records (Andonova et al., 2017). The
number of recorded cooperative climate initiatives rose 56
per cent in low-income countries, and 50 percent in lower-
middle income countries, between 2015 and 2017, but cli-
mate initiatives remain overwhelmingly based in the global
North (Chan et al., 2018b; UNFCCC, 2017, 2018, 2019b). Non-
OECD countries still account for only 22 per cent of partici-
pation in cooperative initiatives, and 23 percent of the lead
partners of initiatives (ClimateSouth, 2018). Many actions –
for instance by small and medium-sized enterprises – in
developing countries remain under the radar. Efforts within
the GCAA to engage large investors and multinational cor-
porations, few based in developing countries, may also lead
to biased representation. Additionally, some developing
country-based actions elude international tracking efforts
because they operate in languages other than English, or
their actions may be framed in terms of sustainable devel-
opment rather than climate action, despite contributing to
climate goals. A survey in Kenya and India found that many
actions by cities, counties, and businesses were not captured
by international reports; for instance, NAZCA recorded just
two companies making climate commitments in Kenya, but
a closer examination of Nairobi Stock Exchange listed com-
panies identified nearly 50 companies with concrete emis-
sions reduction targets (ClimateSouth, 2018). Data-gathering
arrangements in the GCAA may have also contributed to
the reproduction of biases, as data partners are largely
based in North America and Europe.
Finally, developing countries refer to sub- and non-state
actors in their NDCs much more frequently than higher-in-
come countries, particularly in relation to adaptation to cli-
mate change (Hsu et al., 2019a). An appropriate response by
the GCAA may therefore not only be about improving the
visibility and recognition of south-based action, but also
about strengthening capacities for sub- and non-state actors
to contribute to implementation in developing countries.
Global climate action for a new decade: seizing
new opportunities
A post-2020 action space within the UNFCCC process
remains crucial and might even be more important than
before. First, the UNFCCC, which has predominantly focused
on negotiations towards international agreements, has
found itself in a post-Paris climate governance context
which emphasizes implementation. Through the GCAA, the
UNFCCC could continue to promote the contribution of
transnational actors in climate governance and play a rele-
vant role in accelerating implementation, for instance, by
helping national governments and sub- and non-state actors
engage with each other in the implementation of NDCs and
in the development of more ambitious commitments. Sec-
ond, and more broadly still, the COVID-19 crisis introduces a
critical moment to reinvigorate international solidarity, multi-
lateralism and cooperation to better address transboundary
economic, public health, and environmental challenges. In
this context, the GCAA could exemplify a new avenue of
cooperation, featuring effective international cooperation
© 2021 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2021) 12:3
Sander Chan et al.252
not only between governments, but also with and between
sub- and non-state actors that provide solutions in a highly
interconnected and globalized world.
The transition from the pre-2020 climate action agenda to
a post-2020 GCAA provides a political opportunity to recali-
brate the design of the framework, and to effectively
respond to the need for successful international cooperation
and effective implementation. In this context, we highlight
opportunities for sub- and non-state actors to drive national
implementation and ambition; to enable sub- and non-state
climate action at the regional and national levels; and to
realize with broader sustainable development goals, while
applying the principles of a comprehensive, collaborative,
evaluative, and catalytic action agenda.
Driving national implementation and ambition
The year 2020 coincided with the beginning of the first
implementation cycle of the Paris Agreement. A post-2020
agenda should help accelerate implementation at the
national level, amplify ambition of subsequent NDC cycles,
and inform ambitious ‘long-term strategies’ (LTS) for mid-
century low-carbon development (Chan et al., 2019; Herm-
wille, 2018). Ambitious non-state actors could inspire gov-
ernments and give them confidence to adopt more
ambitious targets under the Paris Agreement. A post-2020
GCAA could facilitate ‘NDC labs’ which, for instance building
on sectoral ‘Climate Action Pathways’ (UNFCCC, 2020),
would provide input and feedback at the request of govern-
ments on how they could strengthen their capacity in speci-
fic areas of interest, and subsequently deliver on, and
strengthen their NDCs (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Cli-
mate Actions, 2019). Moreover, the GCAA could stimulate
the aggregation of impacts of climate action at the national
level, rather than at the international level. This would help
governments to better understand sub- and non-state con-
tributions to implementation, and find opportunities for
strengthening climate targets. For instance, America’s
Pledge, a coalition of sub- and non-state actors in the Uni-
ted States, has demonstrated the impact of non-party stake-
holder action through a comprehensive national-level
analysis, pointing out opportunities to adopt higher levels of
ambition in the US (Hultman et al., 2018, 2019). While com-
prehensive national-level data may be difficult to acquire
through NAZCA partners, general guidance can help govern-
ments, particularly in technical tasks such as the accounting
of non-state contributions. Such guidance should take into
account variation across NDCs and sub- and non-state
arrangements at the national level (Hsu et al., 2019a). In this
regard, an important development vis-a-vis mitigation is the
guidance on non-state action developed by the Initiative for
Climate Action Transparency (ICAT, 2018) to help govern-
ments integrate the impact of sub- and non-state mitigation
actions into greenhouse gas projections, targets and plan-
ning. Such integration of sub- and non-state impacts, how-
ever, hinges on the availability of reliable methods and data,
and requires collaboration between governments, sub- and
non-state actors at the national level. Notably, context-
dependent and nationally specific collaboration has been
particularly prominent in Latin America, where around 14
countries have developed their NDCs in collaboration with
non-state actors, and multi-sectoral dialogues have been set
up in Argentina, Costa Rica and Peru (European Commission,
2019). Similarly, several international NGOs and global net-
works, including the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), The Climate
Group, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, and the We
Mean Business coalition, have set up the ‘Alliances for Cli-
mate Action’ (ACA) initiative, which builds national coalitions
of sub- and non-state actors to create supportive constituen-
cies to champion and accelerate climate action; encourage
collaboration; and foster learning at the national level (ACA,
2020).
The year 2023 is important for making progress on the
evaluative functions of the GCAA (and every five years
thereafter), as the first ‘global stocktake’ will be held under
the Paris Agreement to assess ‘collective progress’, and to
inform subsequent NDCs (Hermwille et al., 2019). In their
assessments, governments should integrate data on climate
actions into national target setting and implementation,
including national GHG projections, and new and enhanced
NDCs. Sub- and non-state actors should translate and inter-
pret the results of the global stocktake to their respective
national, regional, local contexts (Hermwille et al., 2019).
Enabling sub- and non-state climate action
nationally and regionally
The GCAA, although placing political emphasis on the need
for action in developing countries, has not featured a bal-
anced geographic representation so far. Fortunately, recent
years have seen the proliferation of efforts to stimulate sub-
and non-state climate action, both at the regional and
national levels, and in specific sectors (Chan et al., 2018a,
2019). For instance, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda
launched the East African Climate Change Technical Work-
ing Group to foster cooperation and the engagement with
non-state actors (Namande, 2018); Regional Climate Weeks
have been organized in Africa, Latin America and the Carib-
bean, Asia Pacific, bringing together regional stakeholders
from the public and private sectors to jointly address cli-
mate change; and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) seeks to
strengthen institutional capacities through its Readiness Pro-
gram, which provides funding for countries to develop
stakeholder engagement processes and deploy climate
finance more efficiently (GCF, 2020). Regional interactions
also increasingly emerge from networks run by non-state
actors, such as LEDSLAC (2020) and ActionLAC, which build
bridges between representatives of national governments
and non-state actors and build regional non-state capacity
for climate action in Latin America. These processes play a
complementary role to the GCAA in the global climate
regime complex. Regional and national processes that foster
climate action enable the participation of more stakeholders
due to reduced language and logistical barriers, at the same
time they provide a more targeted and contextualized
framework for discussion (Chan et al., 2018a). Greater
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similarity between actors in comparable implementation
contexts could also allow for a more experimental approach,
where non-state commitments are treated as ‘informal
experiments’ (Abbott, 2017; see also Bernstein and Hoff-
mann, 2018). Within such a framework, regional and
national orchestrators could encourage different types of
actions, and subsequently evaluate ongoing ‘experiments’ to
distill and diffuse best practices.
Regional and national processes are likely to be more
effective than an enlarged GCAA would be. They are more
proximate to specific implementation contexts and policy
demands; respond to topics that are particularly salient in
these contexts; and are better positioned to encourage
involvement from regional and national organizations in cli-
mate action.
The role of the GCAA in regional and national processes
may be limited, but important. For instance, featuring High-
level Climate Action Champions at regional and national
events, demonstrates high-level support for regional and
national orchestration processes and acknowledges their rel-
evance to the Paris Agreement. However, the GCAA could
also facilitate the sharing of experiences across the regional,
national, and sectoral platforms. Beyond brokering new col-
laborations or showcasing action, such exchanges should
aim at improving technical and operational aspects of mobi-
lization, implementation, reporting, data management, and
accountability procedures across regional and national plat-
forms. They could also help connect both private and public
finance with national and regional platforms, to co-design
and optimize support mechanisms that enable local and
regional climate action.
Maximizing sustainable development synergies
While early sub- and non-state engagement in the UNFCCC
emphasized mitigation (Chan et al., 2016), climate action
has become more comprehensive and the GCAA increas-
ingly emphasizes adaptation. Long regarded as a primarily
local issue, adaptation itself is increasingly seen through
‘teleconnected’ dependencies, for example, through pricing
and global trade that link vulnerabilities across regions
(Adger et al., 2009; Benzie and Persson, 2019). Climate
action can even be more broadly framed, moving beyond
mitigation and adaptation as discrete categories, and
addressing multiple anthropogenic factors across social, eco-
logical and economic systems that interact in non-linear
ways, compounding risks and possibly leading to cascading
effects (Bradley et al., 2020). For instance, biodiversity loss,
climate change, and health risks are interrelated as threat
multipliers. Climate change impacts exacerbate the decline
of ecosystems, and human encroachment on ecosystems
affects the spread of communicable diseases. Climate
change impacts such as droughts disrupt agricultural pro-
ductivity, leading to higher food prices, threatening food
security and health especially among vulnerable communi-
ties (EASAC, 2019). The effects of climate change are com-
pounded by heat islands in densely populated areas,
negatively impacting public health in cities (Hobbhahn
et al., 2019). The GCAA can encourage action with simulta-
neous impacts and co-benefits that enable broader sustain-
able development (Doswald and Osti, 2011; Scobie, 2019).
The COVID-19 crisis illustrates the close connection between
ecological, economic, and health systems, and highlights the
need for a ‘green recovery’ that effectively abates an eco-
nomic, ecological, health, and climate crisis altogether. Vari-
ous approaches exist that can help maximize synergies and
manage trade-offs between different sustainability aspects,
for instance, ‘planetary health’ (Bradley et al., 2020; Watts
et al., 2019), and ‘ecosystem-based’ or ‘nature-based’
approaches (Cohen-Shacham et al., 2016).
Institutionally, the GCAA could rise to the challenge
through the thematic prioritization of specific sustainable
development synergies. For instance, the COP25 decision
emphasized climate action and the integrity of ocean and
coastal ecosystems (UNFCCC, 2019a; paragraph 30). How-
ever, such priorities depend on changing COP presidencies,
complicating a longer and sustained programmatic agenda.
Another important opportunity arises from a generalized
‘governance through goals’ (Biermann et al., 2017) approach
in sustainable development governance, particularly the
2030 Agenda and the SDGs. By setting international goals,
governments have opened up a governance space for a
multiplicity of actors and solutions to contribute towards
goal achievement. Governance approaches across the UN
system are converging towards engagement with sub- and
non-state actors across multiple issue areas through orches-
tration. For instance, the Quito Implementation Platform for
the New Urban Agenda (Marsal-Llacuna, 2018), the Agenda
for People and Nature (Pattberg et al., 2019); and ‘Partner-
ships for the SDGs’ (Chan et al., 2019), all seek to engage
sub- and non-state actors in the contexts of, respectively,
UN Habitat, the Convention of Biodiversity (CBD), and the
UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA).
Together, these platforms allow for taking different entry
points to link climate action to broader sustainable devel-
opment. While these platforms operate separately, collabo-
ration between the GCAA and other orchestrators in
sustainable development governance holds great promise
to demonstrate linkages between climate action and SDGs
(UNFCCC, 2018, 2019b); and to develop operational syner-
gies. Although such exchanges should aim to maximize
synergies, they should also address trade-offs, creating in-
depth knowledge on both intended and unintended, bene-
ficial and detrimental impacts of climate action, and circum-
stances that enable and amplify synergies. Such knowledge
would be an important complement in the GCAA, where
the production of quantifiable (climate mitigation) data has
often been (over-)emphasized.
Collaboration between platforms that orchestrate climate
and sustainable development action would also improve
reflexivity and deliberativeness of governance practices and
could be a major step towards promoting meaningful partic-
ipation and democratic quality in decision-making (Dryzek
and Pickering, 2018; Mert, 2019). While collaborating orches-
tration platforms may not avoid all possible trade-offs
between different aspects of sustainable development,
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deliberation may help build social consensus, generating
outcomes that are considered more just (B€ackstrand and
Kuyper, 2017; B€ackstrand et al., 2017).
Discussion and recommendations
Recent years have seen major steps taken towards linking
state and non-state action. The pre-2020 agenda, the COP21
decision adopting the Paris Agreement, and the MPGCA fur-
ther anchored sub- and non-state climate action in the
UNFCCC’s institutional ecosystem (Hale, 2016). If checked
against Chan et al.’s (2015) design principles, important
achievements have been made in the pre-2020 GCAA. The
pre-2020 agenda highlighted the growing scale and scope
of sub- and non-state action. The UNFCCC Secretariat has
also consistently sought to advance its engagement efforts
through collaborations. From its first attempts under the
LPAA to recent climate action summits, the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat ensured continuity in the promotion and recording of
sub- and nonstate climate actions. It also engaged the ana-
lytical community to better assess such actions. While the
extent to which the pre-2020 agenda was able to generate
new and additional action is difficult to determine, by high-
lighting expanding engagement, the GCAA helped to drive
relative optimism and the momentum for climate action,
even when the climate regime was confronted with severe
setbacks.
Our review has revealed several ways in which a post-
2020 GCAA can improve. Table 1 summarizes opportunities
to strengthen NDC implementation and ambition; to sup-
port national and regional level climate action; to realize
sustainable development synergies and to address possible
conflicts. Following the design principles for the GCAA, such
opportunities could be realized by expanding collaboration,
achieving more comprehensive information, developing
new evaluative methods and deploying catalytic mecha-
nisms.
Importantly, seizing these opportunities will entail varying
levels of governance and capacities. For instance, strength-
ening sub- and non-state action, expanding collaboration,
data collection, and evaluation will mostly require efforts by
national and regional actors. However, the GCAA could play
a role in experience sharing, and facilitating relations with
international financing and support facilities. Similarly, for
deliberative processes between orchestration platforms, the
GCAA will depend on strong inter-agency cooperation.
By seizing opportunities and expanding the GCAA into a
new decade, according to the design principles of a collabo-
rative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic framework, it
would not only improve upon previous engagement activities
in the context of the UNFCCC, but also make a vital contribu-
tion to climate action in challenging times. As the world seeks
to recover from the COVID-19 crisis, a post-2020 GCAA can
help governments keep and enhance their climate commit-
ments, strengthen the sub- and non-state capacity for action,
and help realize sustainable development.
Note
1. This article benefited from a transdisciplinary discussion that involved
researchers and practitioners from both developed and developing
countries and was organized by the ‘Klimalog’ research and dialogue
project for a climate smart and just transformation at the German
Development Institute/Deutsches Institut f€ur Entwicklungspolitik (DIE),
supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development (BMZ). The discussion was held together with ‘Gal-
vanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions’ – a series of open dia-
logues that aims to bring the groundswell of climate actions from
cities, regions, companies and other groups to a higher level of scale
and ambition; York University (Canada); and the University of S~ao
Paulo.An international regime is defined as ‘principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations
converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner 1982, p- 195). The ‘climate
regime’ refers to the regime established by the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which includes
its subsequent rule development through the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
Table 1. Seizing opportunities for a post-2020 GCAA
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and 2015 Paris Agreement, as well as decisions by the respective gov-
erning bodies of these treaties.
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